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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Ce texte propose une nouvelle approche du design des politiques publiques, quand il n'y pas 
de consensus entre experts sur une représentation adéquate de la situation. Techniquement 
parlant, nous adoptons pour ce faire une version généralisée de la théorie traditionnelle de la 
politique économique, telle que développée il y a plusieurs décennies par Jan Tinbergen. 
Contrairement aux solutions existantes à l'incertitude sur les modèles, notre approche ne 
demande pas de connaître la fonction d'utilité des décideurs politiques (à l'inverse de la 
littérature sur l'ambigüité), ni d'avoir un modèle de référence (par contraste avec la théorie du 
contrôle robuste), ni de posséder une distribution de probabilité sur l'ensemble des scénarios 
proposés (a contrario de l'approche bayesienne). Nous montrons que les politiques obtenues 
possèdent plusieurs propriétés que la littérature souvent postule a priori, comme la robustesse 
et la simplicité. 
 




This paper proposes a general way to craft public policy when there is no consensual account 
of the situation of interest. The design builds on a dual extension of the traditional theory of 
economic policy. It does not require a representative policymaker’s utility function (as in the 
literature on ambiguity), a reference model (as in robust control theory) or some prior 
probability distribution over the set of supplied scenarios (as in the Bayesian model-
averaging approach). The obtained policies are shown to be robust and simple in a precise 
and intuitive sense. 
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A picture is a model of reality.
- Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922) -
I. Introduction
Models are an ever-present input of decision and policy making. Be they very sophis-
ticated or not, they always are partial representations of reality. The same object might
therefore admit diﬀerent models. Well-known current examples include global warming
and its various impact assessment models, such as the DICE model conceived by William
Nordhaus (1994) and the PAGE model used by Nicholas Stern (2007, 2008), and macro-
economic policy, with its competing DSGE models that respectively build on the New
Keynesian framework (see, e.g., Richard Clarida et al., 1999; Michael Woodford 2003) or
the Real Business Cycle view (see, e.g., Thomas Cooley 1995).1 Due to theoretical gaps,
lack of data, measurement problems, undetermined empirical speciﬁcations, and the nor-
mal prudence of modelers, such episodes of model uncertainty may often last beyond
any useful horizon.2 Meanwhile, policymakers will be expected to act based on analyses,
scenarios and forecasts which can be at variance from each other.
1 The “Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy” (DICE) is a global-economy model
that explicitly considers the dynamic relationships between economic activity, greenhouse-gas emissions
and climate change. The “Policy Analysis for the Greenhouse Eﬀect” (PAGE), developed by Christopher
Hope (2006), generates emission-reduction costs scenarios for four world regions, acknowledging that
some key physical and economic parameters can be stochastic. There are many other models addressing
the economics of global warming (see, e.g., Alan Manne et al. 1995; Nordhaus and Zili Yang 1996;
Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer 2000; and Stern 2007, chapter 6). Most disagreements between climate
change modellers have to do with discounting, technological innovation, and the treatment of risk and
uncertainty (see, e.g., Geoﬀrey Heal 2008). Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, on
their part, diﬀer mainly in their microfoundations and the way they capture price and wage adjustments.
2 As Andrew Watson (2008, p. 37) recently pointed out, for instance: “In the foreseeable future (next
20 years) climate modelling research will probably not materially decrease the uncertainty on predictions
for the climate of 2100. The uncertainty will only start to decrease as we actually observe what happens
to the climate.” [Emphasis added]
2Economists have recently devoted signiﬁcant eﬀorts to assist policy making in such
circumstances.3 Four approaches can be found in the literature at the moment: model
averaging, discarding dominated policies, deciding under ambiguity, and robust control.4
The ﬁrst one draws on Bayesian decision theory, thanks in part to new means for construct-
ing prior probability distributions (Adrian Raftery et al. 1997; Gary Chamberlain 2000;
Carmen Fernandez et al. 2001; Antoine Billot et al. 2005), and has been advocated by a
number of macroeconomists (see Christopher Sims 2002, William Brock et al. 2003, and
the references therein). The second route, taken for instance by Charles Manski (2000) for
the selection of treatment rules, avoids prior distributions altogether, seeking only policies
that cannot be outdone in at least one model. The third approach acknowledges instead
that several prior distributions might be plausible at the same time; it then develops de-
cision criteria - such as Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler (1989)’s maximin criterion
or the more general adjusted-expected-utility criteria suggested by Zengjing Chen and
Larry Epstein (2002), Peter Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005), and Fabio Maccheroni et al. (2006),
among others - that ﬁt reasonable patterns of behavior in this case (as they have been
documented since Daniel Ellsberg 1961’s seminal article).5 Robust control, ﬁnally, builds
3The ﬁrst recognition of the importance of model uncertainty for the evaluation of macroeconomic
policy actually dates back to William Brainard (1967).
4One might also add exploratory modeling to this list. Pioneered by Steve Bankes (1993), exploratory
modeling combines human judgment with systematic interactive computer experiments on a given family
of plausible models in order to shed light on policy choices. This approach is currently used in long term
policy analysis (see Robert Lempert et al. 2003, for instance). It relies heavily on information technology,
but still lacks some economic foundations.
5The maximin approach has found numerous applications, notably in ﬁnance (see, e.g., Rama Cont
2006, Lorenzo Garlappi et al. 2007, and the references therein).
3on engineering (optimal control) methods for ﬁnding policies that will put up with any
perturbation of a given reference model.6 It was persuasively introduced in macroeco-
nomics by Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas Sargent (2001, 2008); some applications also
exist in natural resources economics (see, e.g., Catarina Roseta-Palma and Anastasios
Xepapadeas 2004).
All these approaches, however, have some drawbacks. As argued for instance by An-
drew Levin and John Williams (2003), there might be no single reference model of the
economy (since key issues such as expectations formation and inﬂation persistence are
still controversial), which often makes robust control impractical. But the main alterna-
tives - Bayesian model-averaging or multiple-prior decision making - call for probabilistic
beliefs over a collection of models or scenarios, which might also prove to be unrealistic
in many situations. A major contribution of the recent literature on belief formation has
actually been to pin down conditions in which entertaining probabilistic beliefs is hardly
achievable or even rational (see the recent survey by Gilboa et al. 2008).7 Besides, the
available criteria for making decisions under ambiguity remain unsatisfactory: the max-
imin criterion really corresponds to an extreme form of uncertainty aversion, whereas the
more general ones are not yet operational (especially for eliciting and capturing collective
6In physics, a “perturbation” means a secondary inﬂuence on a system that causes it to deviate slightly.
Hansen and Sargent (2008) deﬁne the word “slightly” as lying within a certain range of the reference
model, where distance is measured by an entropy-based metric.
7Enriqueta Aragonès et al. (2005) show that complexity, for example, can be one reason for this. A
group of experts might also fail to hold a common prior if the set of models or scenarios is suﬃciently
large (see Martin Cripps et al. 2008).
4preferences). Lastly, falling back on undominated policies will not be good enough, for
such policies can be numerous and are allowed to do very poorly under some scenarios.
Our goal in this paper is to set out a new approach which avoids these shortcomings.
The proposed scheme, which is sketched in Figure 1 and will be formalized in section III,
borrows several core elements from Jan Tinbergen (1952)’s theory of economic policy.8
In this setting, a model brings together endogenous and exogenous variables, and some
policy instruments (the short-term interest rate, say, or a carbon tax). Let diﬀerent models
involving the same policy instruments be simultaneously relevant to policymakers. For
initial values of those instruments and the exogenous variables, each model  =1 
delivers a (possibly dynamic and stochastic) scenario or forecast .I n t h i s c o n t e x t , a
policy rule Φ is a prescription on the utilization of the policy instruments that prompts a
revision of all scenarios. The challenge is to design a suitable rule.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Suppose that each original scenario  is given a welfare score  via a mapping ,
and that the revised scenarios 0
10
 must go through an overall policy assessment
v(0
10
) expressed in monetary units. Call a policy rule eﬀective if its outcome receives
a positive assessment whenever the score of at least one initial scenario falls short of some
pre-established objective. We show in Section IV that an eﬀective policy rule exists if and
only if a shadow price (1) can be put on each conﬁguration of scores so that
v ◦ Φ =  ◦  .( 1 )
8For an historical perspective, literature review and appraisal, the reader may consult the articles
by Andrew Hughes Hallett (1989), Ben van Velthoven (1990), Thráinn Eggertsson (1997), and Nicola
Acocella and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (2007).
5This is a straightforward consequence of a generalization of Farkas’s Lemma - a statement
central to linear programming and convex optimization - due to Bruce Craven (1972).
Once an appropriate shadow price schedule  is determined, a convenient policy Φ can
then be seeked by solving equation (1).
The scores  and assessment v should be regarded as common features of the policy
process, as opposed to subjective attributes of an imaginary individual planner. Scores are
indeed inherent in rule-based policies such as the Taylor Rule (proposed by John Taylor
1993) or the Kyoto Protocol, where they convey positive or negative deviations from some
intended GDP level and inﬂation rate or some emission reduction target respectively. The
assessment v may reﬂect the value or merit of policy outcomes to all members of an oﬃcial
board (perhaps following several discussion rounds, as reported for instance by Sims 2002,
and Eric Leeper and Sargent 2003). The shadow price , on the other hand, can be seen
as expressing the policymakers’ joint willingness-to-pay for avoiding exposure to uncertain
welfare levels in the range {1}. Equation (1) thus says that an eﬀective remedy
will make the value of its results match the willingness to escape the current situation.
To ﬁx ideas further on this approach, the next section gives a short example of what it
can do in comparison to previous methods. The formal framework and general construc-
tion of policy rules are then laid out in Sections III and IV respectively. Key economic
properties of these rules - such as self-restraint, non-neutrality, holism, robustness, and
simpleness - are shown and discussed in Section V; note that these attributes are not
postulated ex ante but are derived from the construction. Section VI ﬁnally concludes
with further remarks on the implementation and some extensions of the proposed scheme.
6II. An Example
Suppose there are two models of the economy, none of which is accepted as a bench-
mark.9 Each model  =1 2 generates forecasts of aggregate wealth which take the form
of normal distributions (−;(1−)2
) with mean − and variance (1−)2
.T h e
parameters  and 2
 are exogenous and speciﬁc to each model. The variable ,w h i c hi s
s c a l e ds oa st ob e l o n gt ot h ei n t e r v a l[01], refers to variance-reducing policies that cost
one unit of wealth per unit of decrease in volatility. Let 1  2 and 2
1  2
2,s ot h eﬁrst
model reckons a larger average wealth but also greater volatility for any given policy .
In order to apply the undominated-policies and model-averaging approaches, assume
the policymakers’ preferences over wealth are representable using the constant-absolute-
risk-aversion (CARA) utility function ()=−− with coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion . It is well-known that ranking the forecasts of models  =1 2 based on
the expected values of a CARA utility function amounts to comparing the certainty
equivalents












− 1) ,  =1 2.
Undominated policies will then generally take the form  =1(if 
2





2  1 for some ). Alternatively, a Bayesian policy maker who holds that













+ ac o n s t a n t
9This example is purely illustrative and has no pretence of realism.
7and be thereby led to select  =0or 1.W h e n
2
1
2  1  1 and 
2
2
2  1  2, however,
such dichotomous policies will perform rather poorly under one model.10
In the latter case, by contrast, the maximin policy ∗ sits at the intersection of the
curves 1() and 2(), for any set of priors that includes  ≈ 1 and  ≈ 0.T h i sa c t i o n
certainly limits the policy maker’s exposure to regrettable expected-utility outcomes if
either scenario turns out to be the wrong one. But it may seem overly cautious to several
people, especially if one model preﬁgures a very large return from modifying ∗ slightly.
Turning now to this paper’s approach, consider for simplicity the situation depicted




Insert Figure 2 about here.
Suppose  =0is the current policy, so the initial forecasts are in fact  = (;2
).
Ascribe the welfare scores  =  − 
2

2 to these forecasts; let the revised scenarios be
0
 = ( − ;(1− )2














as the ex post policy assessments. If the function
(1 2)=−min[1 2]
captures the policymakers’ combined willingness-to-pay to avoid the existing welfare pos-




















10Obviously, the recommended policies took values 0 or 1 b e c a u s ew ea s s u m e dt h ec o s to fp o l i c yw a s
linear. Supposing instead a convex cost () could have resulted in solutions 0 1, but the contrasts
we want to emphasize with these standard approaches to model uncertainty would then fade away.
8This yields two candidates •
 and •
. These policies will not do as well as ∗ in the worst
case, of course. But their respective return will never be inferior to the policymakers’
subjective quote (1 2) to escape the current uncertain situation. In the above ﬁgure,
moreover, •
 produces a much higher reward than ∗ if model 1 turns out to be right.
Policies like •
 and •
 could have been generated as well through the maximin ap-
proach, using a speciﬁc set of priors that excludes  =0and  =1 ,o ri n v o k i n go n eo f
the recent criteria for decision making under ambiguity. Our method, however, does not
involve a selection of prior distributions (which might have required an inﬁnite regress in
beliefs) or an exact encoding of ambiguity aversion. The scores  and policy evaluations
v(0
1 0
2), moreover, should be viewed as directly observable components of the policy
process that do not need to be traced back to a particular utility function. We shall
reﬂect further on this in the upcoming sections, where we make our construction more
general and rigorous.
III. The Basic Framework
Consider an expert or model  which brings together some exogenous parameters  ∈
Υ, policy (or control) variables  ∈  and endogenous variables () ∈ .A te a c hs p e -
ciﬁc instances of  and , this model generates a scenario or forecast  = (();)
which belongs to a set Ω. There is a total preorder over Ω, denoted ., which corresponds
to the policymakers’ preferences over all scenarios: for any two scenarios  and w in Ω,
 . w means that w is “preferable” to  from the policymakers’ viewpoint.11 Let the
11Recall that a binary relation . deﬁned over the set Ω is a total preorder if, for all ,w ,w ◦ ∈ Ω,( i )
9function  : Ω → R represent the policymakers’ preferences on a numerical scale, i.e.  .
w if and only if () ≤ (w).
A. Multiple-Scenario Assessments
From now on, there will be 1 diﬀerent models, denoted 1,d r a w nf r o m
a set . At a given time, policymakers are then presented a variety of forecasts  =
(1 2) which belong to the cartesian product Ω;f o r =1 ,w eh a v et h a t
 = (();), so all models feature the same policy variables (but not necessarily
the same exogenous parameters, endogenous variables, or even relationships and structure
linking variables and parameters). The preorder relation . c a nb ea p p l i e dc o m p o n e n t w i s e
to obtain the canonical preorder ¹ on Ω:12
 ¹ w if and only if  . w for all  =1  .
If   w for all  =1 ,w ew r i t e ≺ w. One can also construct the assessment
function  : Ω → R as ()=( (1)()) = (1 ).L e tΣ = (Ω) ⊆ R
denote the image of ; the function  : Ω → Σ is then surjective,b yd e ﬁnition.
B. Policy Rules
Without loss of generality, the number 0 will be seen as a threshold or target for policy.
Let Σ− = Σ \ R
+ = { =( 1) ∈ Σ :   0 for some },s u p p o s i n gt h a tΣ− is
either  . wo rw.  (completeness property), (ii)  .  (reﬂexivity), and (iii)  . wa n dw. w◦
implies  . w◦ (transitivity). When  . wa n dw. , one usually writes w ∼ , meaning that w is
“equivalent” to  from the policymakers’ viewpoint. When  . w but not w . ,w ew r i t ew.
12A more general framework would have several sets Ω with respective complete preorder .,  =1 
(meaning that the range of possible forecasts and their ranking may depend on who the underlying model
or expert is), while the function  takes values in a completely preordered (not necessarily numerical)
set. The results shown below are still valid under these extensions.
10nonempty and strictly included in Σ; each element of the set Ω
− = −1 (Σ−) thus contains
at least one scenario policymakers deem bad enough to warrant some remedial action.
Assume that a single action 0(which may itself involve the simultaneous or sequential
deployment of several policy instruments) is undertaken at a given time, and that each
expert or model  is able in this case to provide a revised scenario 0
 = ((0)0;).
Policy intervention can then be portrayed as a function Φ : Ω → Ω such that Φ()=0
captures its impact (according to the same  models) 0 =( 0
10
20
) on all the initial
scenarios (1 2) comprised in .I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w er e f e rt oΦ as a policy rule.
C. Policy Evaluation
Modiﬁed scenarios and forecasts are ultimately subject to overall appraisals. These
a r eg i v e nb yt h ef u n c t i o nv : Ω → ,w h e r e is a set of real numbers. Below, we denote
+ the intersection  ∩ R+, and we assume that + is a nonempty strict subset of .
In their account of monetary policy, Levin and Williams (2003, p. 946) report that
a policymaking committee usually seeks policy outcomes that are acceptable to all its
members. In agreement with this stylized fact, the function v will be supposed to meet
the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Unanimity).  ∈ Ω
− ⇔ v() ≤ 0 .
In other words, policies that perform very poorly in at least one of the committee members’
model, and thus fail to be consensual, will receive a nonpositive score. Let  : Ω → 
denote the composition  = v ◦ Φ of the functions v and Φ. Under Assumption 1, it
can be understood as the policymakers’ willingness-to-accept am o d i ﬁcation of the initial
11scenarios by means of the policy rule Φ. Accordingly, the set , with generic element ,
can be seen as a set of quotes.
This completes the background necessary for laying out our general approach to policy
design under model uncertainty.
IV. A General Approach for Policy Making
The foundation of our approach is the following adaptation to the present context and
notation of a theorem demonstrated in Craven (1972; theorem 2.1). This theorem is a
nonlinear generalization of the well-known Farkas’s Lemma of convex analysis.
Theorem: If  : Ω → Σ is surjective, then
 ()= (w) ⇒ ()=(w) and (2)
 () ∈ Σ− ⇒ () ∈ + (3)
for all , w ∈ Ω if and only if there exists a function  : Σ →  such that
 =  ◦  and (Σ−) ⊂ + .( 4 )
The above framework ensures that the theorem’s hypothesis is satisﬁed.13 A policy
rule Φ that fulﬁlls condition (3) can be called eﬀective; it amends any combination of bad
scenarios so that no further intervention is needed. Condition (2) is one of consistency:
scenarios which get the same rankings trigger equivalent policies (from the policymakers’
standpoint). Of course, one may have Φ() 6= Φ(w) but ()=(w), so this condition
does not exclude applying diﬀerent treatments to similar scenarios (as the above example
13If Ω, Σ and  are topological spaces,  is a continuous open map and  is continuous, one can also
show that the price schedule  must be continuous (see Craven 1972).
12illustrates). Condition (2) does not apply to situations where wi sap e r m u t a t i o no f,
for in this case  () 6=  (w) most of the time; the identity of an expert who supports a
given scenario may thus matter for policy.
Since (Σ−) ⊂ +,s o(1) is positive if an initial assessment  is bad (  0
for some ), the “dual” function  can be typically interpreted as indicating the “price”
policymakers would pay to avoid an original set of potential welfare levels {1 }.
The theorem then says that a consistent and eﬀective policy rule must be such that the
policymakers’ collective willingness-to-accept its impact  = v ◦ Φ matches their joint
willingness-to-pay ◦ to escape the initial forecasts. The proof of this statement follows.
Proof (Craven 1972): Suppose that conditions (2) and (3) are true. Then, for each
 ∈ Σ,l e t()=(),w h e r e is any element of Ω such that ()=. Condition (2)
ensures that  is a well-deﬁned function. Furthermore, its domain is Σ,s i n c e(Ω)=Σ,
and  =  ◦  by deﬁnition. If  ∈ Σ−,t h e n = () for some  ∈ Ω
−,a n d( 3 )e n t a i l s
 () ∈ Σ− ⇒ ()=() ∈ + ,
so (Σ−) ⊂ +. Conversely, let  : Σ →  satisfy (4); the function  deﬁned as  = ◦
obviously meets (2) and (3). ¥
This theorem justiﬁes seeking a suitable policy Φ by solving the fundamental equation
v ◦ Φ =  ◦  .( 1 )
The construction ﬁrst relies on the mappings  and v, which refer to ex ante and ex
post scenario assessments. Such evaluations are at least implicit in any working policy
process, and the functions  and v, being general ones, should be able to ﬁtm o s tc o m m o n
practices. The approach also chieﬂy involves the willingness-to-pay . The latter may
13be directly elicited from policymakers, inferred from past policies Φ (solving then the
equation v ◦ Φ =  ◦  with respect to ), or simply taken so that − ◦  = v( a s
in the above example).14 Once ,va n d are at hand, one can ﬁnd Φ by working out
equation (1) directly, as in the example of Section II, or by taking a quasi-inverse v[−1] of
vs ot h a t 15
Φ = v
[−1] ◦  ◦  .( 5 )
To strengthen the present role and interpretation of , let us replace the theorem’s
condition that (Σ−) ⊂ + with the following stronger requirement.
Assumption 2 (Strict willingness-to-pay).  ∈ Σ− ⇔ ()  0 .
As we shall now see, policy rules built with shadow prices  that satisfy the latter have
appealing characteristics.
V. Some Key Economic Properties of Policy Rules
The literature on model uncertainty normally stipulates ap r i o r ithat the designed
policy rules possess certain desirable properties. One such property is robustness,w h i c h
calls for policies that may not be optimal under some models but will be acceptable if any
of the ex post scenarios materializes (see, e.g., Hansen and Sargent 2008). Another one
is simpleness, which precludes policies from ﬁne-tuning the available models to achieve
speciﬁc scenarios. This section shows that our approach actually endows the obtained
14Implementation issues and the elicitation of  are further discussed in the concluding section.
15The mapping v[−1] :  → Ω is a quasi-inverse of v if v ◦ v[−1]◦ v = v. Every function has a
quasi-inverse (if the Axiom of Choice holds). Yet, v[−1] is not unique unless v is a bijection. Note that
v[−1] can be a quasi-inverse of v but not vice versa; this fact must be dealt with in order to use (5).
14policy rules with these (and other) valuable properties.
One ﬁrst pleasing attribute of a policy rule Φ which solves equation (1) under Assump-
tions (1) and (2) is that it eliminates all the bad initial scenarios and never induces an
unfavorable one. Hence, when a model  initially renders a forecast  such that ()  0,
nobody would challenge the rule.
Property 1 (Consensual remedy): For all  ∈ Ω
−, Φ()  ∈ Ω
− .
Proof: Suppose there exists some  ∈ Ω
− with Φ() ∈ Ω
−. By Assumption 1, we
must have that v ◦ Φ() ≤ 0. However, since  ∈ Ω
−, () ∈ Σ− and  ◦ ()  0 by
Assumption 2. This contradicts the fact that v ◦ Φ()= ◦ (). ¥
By contrast, policy intervention will not receive unanimous support when all initial
scenarios are good, for it will give rise to at least one bad forecast.
Property 2 (Self-restraint): Let Ω
+ = Ω \ Ω
−.F o ra l l ∈ Ω
+, Φ()  ∈ Ω
+ .
Proof: Assume there exists some  ∈ Ω
+ with Φ() ∈ Ω
+. By Assumption 1, we must
have that v ◦ Φ()  0. However, since  ∈ Ω
+, () ∈ Σ \ Σ− and  ◦ () ≤ 0 by
Assumption 2. This contradicts the fact that v ◦ Φ()= ◦ (). ¥
A direct consequence of these properties is that Φ does not have a ﬁxed point. This
means that no policy intervention is without consequences on the ex post scenarios.
Property 3 (Non neutrality): For all  ∈ Ω, Φ() 6=  .
This third property may serve as a warning on policymakers to use the policy rule wisely.
It may alternatively be viewed as a rough safeguard against indiﬀerent or stubborn experts
who would maintain their initial forecast after the policy rule was applied.
15Finally, call an application Γ : Ω → Ω decomposable if there are functions  : Ω →
Ω=1  such that Γ()=( 1(1)()) for all  =( 1) ∈ Ω.16 A
policy rule Φ constructed as above will not have this feature.
Property 4 (Holism): The policy rule Φ : Ω → Ω is not decomposable.
Proof: Suppose instead that Φ()=( 1(1)()) for all  =( 1) ∈ Ω.
Take now some ¦ =( ¦
1¦
) ∈ Ω
+ so that (1(¦
1))  0, and consider an n-tuple
∇ =( ¦
12) where ()  0.W et h e nh a v et h a tΦ(5)=( 1(¦
1) ())
with 1(¦
1)  0, which contradicts Property 1. ¥
In concrete terms, Property 4 says that the way a policy intervention determined by Φ
is going to amend an original scenario will depend on all the scenarios initially submitted
to policymakers.17 This calls attention to the eﬀect an upstream decision (which could
be based on strategic, ideological or epistemological considerations) to let a scenario in or
not might have on the design of policy.
A. Robustness
If one is ready to assume that the set Ω, partially ordered by ¹, is a complete lattice,18
Property 3 combined with some ﬁxed-point theorems of lattice theory (see Brian Davey
16This is a stronger form of decomposability. In mathematics and computer science, the decomposition
of a multivalued function Γ : Ω → Ω involves some functions 1 : Ω → Ω and Λ : Ω → Ω
such that Γ()=Λ(1()()) for all  ∈ Ω.
17This is actually true as well for policies that suit the maximin criterion.
18Recall that (Ω¹) is a complete lattice if, in addition to properties (ii) and (iii) listed in footnote
10, we have that (iv) for all , w ∈ Ω,  ¹ wa n dw ¹  implies  = w( antisymmetry)a n d( v )
every subset of Ω has a least upper bound (supremum) and a greatest lower bound (inﬁmum) in Ω
(completeness). Property (iv), which makes ¹ an order relation, forbids that two scenarios  and wb e
equivalent without being identical (i.e. such that  ∼ w for all ); to satisfy this, one may take Ω as a
set made of collections of equivalent scenarios, each collection being represented by one of its elements.
16and Hilary Priestley 2002, theorems 8.22 and 8.23) implies that the policy rule Φ is neither
order-preserving (or monotone) nor all-improving - the latter meaning that  ≺ Φ() for
all  ∈ Ω. This characteristic actually holds on the very domain Ω
− where policy
intervention is needed.
Property 5 (Imperfect enhancement): For at least one  ∈ Ω
−,w eh a v et h a t ⊀ Φ().




− = { =( 1) ∈ Ω
 | ()=  0 for all  6=1 }.
Since Ω is a complete lattice, the set Ω
− has a supremum ∨Ω




)=  0 for all  6=1 ,s o ∈ Ω
−.T a k i n gΦ(),c o n s i d e rn o wt h en - t u p l e
4 =( Φ1()
2
) which diﬀers from  in having the ﬁrst component of the latter
replaced by the ﬁrst component Φ1() of Φ(). Such a n-tuple also belongs to Ω
−,s o
we must have that Φ1(4) . 
1. This inequality contradicts our initial assumption. ¥








2 = (2). Together with Property 1, it captures the meaning
of robustness: the policy rule Φ fulﬁlls its objectives in taking care of the unwelcome
original scenarios, sometimes at the expense of the good ones (hence in a nonoptimal way
with respect to some models), but never to the point of changing the latter into bad ones.
Properties 1 and 5 suggest in addition that solving equation (1) provides a means of
crafting precautionary policies.19 Reporting on the Federal Reserve Chairman’s conference
to the 2004 annual meeting of the American Economic Association, Carl Walsh (2004)
19See Barrieu and Sinclair-Desgagné (2006) for further discussion on this point and the related imple-
mentation of the so-called Precautionary Principle.
17deﬁned a precautionary policy as one that “would err on the side of reducing the chance
that the more costly outcome occurs.” Satisfying the maximin criterion was then seen as a
practical way to bring about such a policy. Our approach now oﬀers a distinct alternative,
which also gives priority, but not exclusive attention, to the worst cases.
B. Simpleness
Simple policy rules were advocated decades ago by Milton Friedman (1968), consider-
ing the complexity of the economy and the ensuing uncertainty of policymakers. In the
present context, this requirement can be understood as saying that the range of working
policies () ⊂  should be narrower (thereby forcing policy rules to be less elaborate),
when the number of disagreeing scenarios comprised in  increases. Our approach will
obey this desideratum in at least two occasions.
Property 6, case I (Decreasing policy range),: Let v(w)=−1 if (w)  0 for at least
one ,a n dv (w)=1otherwise. Starting with at least one bad scenario, the set of policies
for which equation (1) is satisﬁed decreases with the number of scenarios .








the set of policies that can then solve equation (1). Consider the augmented family of
scenarios (+1) where +1 = +1(+1(+1);+1).T h i sc o n ﬁguration belongs
to Ω
+1






0;+1)) = 1} ,
must be a subset of (). ¥
18In other words, when ex post policy appraisals take only two values, as will happen if
they express collective decisions to endorse (v()=1 )o rd i s a p p r o v e( v ()=−1)a l lm o d -
iﬁed conﬁgurations of scenarios, greater model uncertainty in circumstances where policy
intervention is warranted (according to properties 1 and 2) will reduce the policymakers’
options and so make ﬁne-tuned remedies less likely.







be the set of successful actions if  ◦ ()=. A similar conclusion now holds.
Property 6, case II (Decreasing policy range): Suppose that (i) 0() ⊂ ()
when 0  0,f o ra l l and ,( i i )+1(+1) ⊂ () for all , , (+1),
and (iii)  increases with the relative number of bad scenarios. Then (+1) ⊂ ()
when  ∈ Ω
− and (+1)  0.
Proof: Take (+1) such that  ∈ Ω
− and (+1)  0.L e t  ◦ ()= and
 ◦ (+1)=0. By (iii), we have that 0  0. It now follows that
(+1)=0+1(+1) ⊂ +1(+1) ⊂ ()=() ,
where the ﬁrst and second inclusions come respectively from (i) and (ii). ¥
That is, when having to meet a higher willingness to pay (assumption i) or deal with
more disagreeing experts (assumption ii) reduces the policymakers’ choice, and when the
policymakers’ collective quote to avoid an initial situation goes up with the proportion of
bad scenarios (assumption iii), greater model uncertainty in circumstances where policy
intervention is increasingly justiﬁed might again induce simpler policy rules.
19VI. Conclusion
In the presence of model uncertainty, having a policy process that formally assesses and
ranks ex ante forecasts and ex post policy outcomes may suﬃc et od e v e l o pa ne ﬀective and
consistent policy rule, provided one also knows the policymakers’ joint willingness-to-pay
to avoid an initial conﬁguration of scenarios. Under unanimous decision making and strict
willingness-to-pay, the obtained policy rules will share a number of additional properties,
such as self-restraint, robustness and simpleness. These results do not depend on knowing
a representative policymaker’s probabilitistic beliefs and utility function. They remain
valid whether model uncertainty is due to empirical limitations or conﬂicting paradigms.
T h i sp a p e r ’ so b j e c t i v ew a st oo ﬀer a general framework to design trigger policies when
there is no consensual trigger. A worthwhile particular application, for instance, might
currently be in the area of banking regulation. Banks and other ﬁnancial institutions are
generally required to hold a minimal capital level to protect deposits against a potential
drop in the value of their assets. It is widely accepted, however, that capital reserves
should vary according to a bank’s risk exposure: one that heavily invested in highly liquid
and very safe securities (such as U.S. government bonds), for example, should not need to
keep the same amount of reserves. Under the 2006 Basel II agreement, regulators can thus
allow an institution to use credit ratings from certain approved agencies when calculating
its net capital reserve requirements. More recently, some related market instruments, such
as the price of credit default swaps (Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales 2009) or the diﬀerence
between the Libor rate and the overnight swap rate (John Taylor and John Williams 2009),
20have been proposed as alternatives or complements to achieve the same goal. All these
schemes (including those based on the so-called “value-at-risk”) have merits and defects:
the price of credit default swaps (CDS), for instance, reﬂects in principle the probability
a given institution is insolvent, but the CDS market is believed by many to be rather thin
and subject to distortions. A regulator who prefers to be eclectic on the matter could
use our framework as follows.20 In the above language, consider each valuable source of
warnings about a given ﬁnancial institution - credit rating agencies, credit default swaps,
etc. - as if it were a particular “model” , and the corresponding ratings or prices
at a given time as a “scenario” . Scenarios from any model clearly depend on the
same policy variable: the institution’s current capital reserves. Policy triggers are now
captured by the functions (); to render Hart and Zingales (2009, p. 14)’s suggestion,
for example, if  stands for CDS prices over the last 30 trading days, then () might
be negative when those prices were above some pre-speciﬁed threshold for at least 20
days. Let (()) measure the policymakers’ joint degree of apprehension about
the institution’s ﬁnancial health and its (possibly systemic) consequences, based on the
available scenarios and triggers. Taking v = − ◦  as the criterion to assess ex post
scenarios, capital requirements which are (in theory, at least) robust, consistent, holistic
and eﬀective (the latter ensuring that the ﬁnancial institution is solvent with probability
one) could ﬁnally be set by solving equation (1).
20Of course, policymakers might as well pay less attention to seeking preventive trigger mechanisms
and center instead on some capital insurance scheme to mitigate the costs of a crisis (as proposed by Anil
Kashyap et al. 2008).
21Several issues must naturally be dealt with before such conclusions are guaranteed to
hold in practice. First, one needs to understand how political and strategic factors could
distort the observed assessments and declared willingness-to-pay. Given its inﬂuence on
policy design, the set of relevant models might also be manipulated by some interested
parties. Handling these concerns satisfactorily will require extending the present team-
theoretic context to a strategic multiple-player one.21 S e c o n d l y ,o n em u s tb ea b l et o
systematically ﬁnd the functions ,v ,a n d.T h eﬁrst one might again be inherent to
the policy mechanism (as in the example of the previous paragraph). The latter might
be directly elicited from policymakers, using for example some form of prediction market
(Justin Wolfers and Eric Witzewitz 2004), or estimated thanks to some recent advances in
computer simulation (Joshua Epstein and Robert Axtell 1996). Last, one ought to analyze
a dynamic version of the current scheme which allows models to evolve and policymakers
to learn, something proponents of model averaging or the ambiguity criteria have already
done (see, e.g., Larry Epstein and Martin Schneider 2007). A ﬁr s ts t e pi nt h i sd i r e c t i o n
would be to consider what happens to the policy rule Φ when the set of scenarios Ω shrinks
or expands. At some point, the true scenario might not even be among those supplied.
This case remains a puzzle for the Bayesian and ambiguity approaches, which rely on
probability distributions. Our method, however, might adequately come to terms with it
because beliefs concerning whether at least one forecast can be trusted can be embedded
in the shadow price . This point calls again for further investigation.
21The classical theory of economic policy has already been taken in this direction by Acocella and Di
Bartolomeo (2006).
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Figure 2.  The maximin and this paper’s solutions
 